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THE U:P,.CT ON THE t\..VY 01" PUBLIC CCr;CEHN ilI'LH
C0XTROL Ci' POLLt:IC~ 0: T:E 5in3 3Y OIL
CHAPTER I
IN7riOJUC'l'ICN
A cursory glance at any of today's newspapers will probably dis-
close one or two articles on pollution problems. Additionally, there
will be as well, several advertiser.tents by commercial firms, the govern-
ment, or ecology groups espousing their programs for improving the
environment and appealli'% for help from the individual. This increasing
concern with the environment has resulted in extensive programs be-
ing undertaken by both industry and government to reduce, prevent and
eventually eliminate pollution. Durir.g the last six years alone, three
affiendments have been enacted to strengthen the Federal Water Pollution
*Control Act, and no less than three international agreements have been
**signed or brought into force to control pollution at sea.
Much of this legislation is directed towards controlling oil
pollution. Just what is behind this current wave of concern and what
has occurred to generate it?
Production. The highly industrialized nature of today's
world has created an ever increasing demand for fossil fuels. World
*The ~ater ~ua1ity Act of 1965, (Fublic Law 89-234); :he Clean
~later jiestoration hct of 1966, lPublic Law 89-753); and The ','iater
Quality Improvement Act of 1970, (Public ~aw 91-224).
·;;-',,-The h:~ree;!(ent Concer-ning Pollution of t::e 3ea by Cil, June 1969
I.Th2 i;ort:l "';ea -act.}, the Interr.i:.ticnal Convention :.elating to Inter-
vention on the Eigh .3ee.s in Cases of Cil Pollution Casualties, November'
1969, and the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pol.Lution I;an:a;.:e, j·loverr,ber 1969.
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production of oil in 1969, for e~ple, was over fifteen billion
barrels,l almost double the 1960 production of about 7.8 billion
2barrels. Twenty-two nations ?roduced 17~ of the 1969 production,
about 2.2 billion barrels, frou. offshore vells.3 The well known
Santa Barbara Charillel ir.cident and several recent oil spills in the
Gulf of :·.exico have focussed public attention on the hazards of off-
shore production. Increasing production in this area will add
significantly to the problems of oil pollution control at sea.
Transportation. Approximately 60:.6 of the present world
production of oil is transported by sea and it is estimated that one
tenth of one percent of this oil is lost at sea.4 This translates to
about seven million barrels of oil annually being discharged into the
sea in one way or another. There are about four thousand tankers in
the world fleet with an average age of eleven years. 5 Some of these
tankers are safe and carefully run, yet seldor.. controlled by law.
Others are obsolete and negligently operated by crews of questionable
skill and experience.6 These tar~ers, while enroute, dischar~e various
amounts of oily waste from tank washings, ballast water and bilges.
Collisions, groundings, ~ld other casualties frequently release large
quantities of oil, generally close to shore. The spectacular dis-
asters that have occurred in the last few years in the course of pro-
d~cticn ~d shipp~ng have attracted much attention and adverse publicity.
Production and transportation of oil, to meet the demands of in-
creased industrialization around the world, is bour.d to increase at
rates that will drastically change the Ficture of control cf oil
pollution at sea.
Natural j-'olh.:tion. Accidental and intentional discharges
2
incident to production and h~dling ere not the only source of oil on
the sea. Natural faults--crecks in the ocean floor in the vicinity of
oil deposits--al10w oil uncer pressure to seep into the water at various
locations. There are several natural leaks in the Caribbean and off
the coast of Caiifornia. For centuries these natural faults have been
discharging oil which has suose~uentlywashed up and polluted beaches.?
Today they may be sources of occasional slicks of undetermined origin.
Effects. It is difficult at best to evaluate the biological
and chemical damages of oil pollution, but the physical effects are
graphically evident in the blackened beaches and coastlines around the
8
world and in the floating "tar balls" ""f-ound in mid-ocean. It is this
dramatically visible effect ~~et has stirred public concern.
~hatever the underlying cause, the fact remains that oil has been
and is being discharged onto the sea and in nany cases washed up onto
public and private beaches, and unknown damage is being done to delicate
marine life cycles. Thus, prevention of such darr.age is high on the list
of priorities for both national and international concern.
In the face of the ever incre~sir.g potential for pollution,
President Nixon has pledged that federal agencies v.i.ll take the lead
in pollution abate~ent programs. 9
It is the purpose of this paper to evaluate the impact on the
Navy of this intense public concern with oil pollution.
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CHAPTEit 1
. INTRODUCTION
A cursory glance at any of today's newspapers will probably
disclose one or two articles on pollution problems. Additionally,
there will be as well, several advertise~ents by co~mercial firms,
the government, or ecology groups espousing their programs for
improving the environment and appealing for help from the individual.
This increasing concern with tte environment has resulted in extensive
progr~s being undertaken by both industry and government to reduce,
prevent and eventually eliminate pollution. During the last five
years alone, three amendments have been enacted to strengthen the
Federal ~ater Pollution Control Act,l and no less than three inter-
national agreements have been signed or brought into force to con-
. :2trol pollut10n at sea.
Much of this legislation is directed towards controlling oil
pollution. Just what is behind this current wave of concern and
what has occurred to generate it?
Production. The highly industrialized nature of today's
world has created an ever increasing demand for fossil fuels.
World production of oil in 1969, for example, was over fifteen
billion bar~els,3 almost double the 1960 production of about 7.8
billion barrels.4 Twenty-two nations produced 17% of the 1969 pro-
duction, about 2.2 billion barrels, from offshore wells. 5 The well
known 3anta 3arbara Channel incident and several recent oil spills
in the Julf of ,·.exico have focussed public attention on the hazards
1
of offshore production. Increasing production in this area will
add significantly to the problems of oil pollution control at sea.
TranSDortation. Approximately 60% of the present world
production of oil is transported by sea and it is estimated that
one tenth of one percent of this oil is lost at sea.6 This trans-
lates to about seven million barrels of oil annually being discharged
into the sea in one way or another. There are about four thousand
tankers in the world fleet with an average age of eleven years.?
Some of these tankers are safe and carefully run, yet seldom con-
trolled by law. Others are obsolete and negligently operated by
crews of questionable skill and experience.8 These t~~ers, while
enroute, discharge various amounts of oily waste from tank washings,
ballast water and bilges. Collisions, groundings, and other casualties
frequently release large quantities of Oil, generally close to shore.
The spectacular disasters that have occurred in the last few years
.
in the course of production and shipping have attracted nmch attention
and adverse publicity.
Production and transportation of oil, to meet the demands of
increased industrialization around the world, is bound to increase
at rates that will drastically change the picture of control of oil
pollution at sea.
Natural Pollution. Accidental and intentional discharges
incident to production and handling are not the only source of oil
on the sea. Natural faults--cracks in the ocean floor in the vicinity
of oil deposits--allo~oil under pressure to seep into the water at
various locations. There are several natural leaks in the Caribbean
2
and off the coast of California. For centuries these natural faults
have been discharging oil which has subsequently washed up and polluted
beaches.9 Today they Eay be sources of occasional slicks of undeter-
n.i.ned origin.
Effects. Is is difficult at best to evaluate the biological
and chemical damages of oil pollution, but the physical effects are
graphically evident in the blackened beaches and coastlines around
the world and in the floating "tar balls" found in mid_ocean.10 It
is this dran~tically visible effect that has stirred public concern.
Whatever the underlying cause, the tact remains that oil has
been and is being discharged onto the sea and in many cases washed
up onto public and private beaches, and unknown damage is being done
to delicate ~arine life cycles. Thus, prevention of such damage is
now and will continue in the future to be high on the list of priorities
for both national and international concern.
In the face of the ever increasing potential for pollution,
President Nixon has pledged that federal agencies will take the lead
in pollution abatement programs.l l
It is the purpose of this paper to evaluate the impact on the
Navy of this policy, with specific emphasis on oil pollution, which
has been generated by the intense public concern with ecology and
the environrr,ent.
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CHAPTER II
THE NAVI PRO.8.LEM
The Navy faces an imrr.ense potential for oil pollution. A review
of the Navy's basic operation situation and requirements will give
some appreciation of the magnitude of the problem-.
Operations. The Navy operates some seven hundred ships,
n.ost of which use hydrocarbon fuels, from thirteen major United States
port areas and nine overseas bases .l~. Of the United. States bases,
twelve are in harbors that have major oil traffic, and seven of those
2twelve have traffic exceeding one hundred million barrels annually.
(The least of any port is twenty-two million barrels annuallJ')
Although it is the Navy's problem under consideration here, it must
be kept in mind that the oil pollution problems are mutually shared
with commercial interests •
.
Navy ships and stations are constantly subject to public
scrutiny and are perceived as a IDQjor source of oil pollution. Deploy-
ments and home-comings are frequently items of local news interest.
Navy bases are generQ11y located in easily accessible areas and are
often open to public visiting. This is in cor.trast to :'erchant
ships which normally dock in industrial areas of the city, out of
general view of the public. Additionally, Navy ships in large nun.ber-s
are routinely in port for long periods of tin:e, con pared to merchants
which frequently spend less than a day at the dock. It is only hurr-an
nature to focus at~ention on those problems that can be readily seen.
Thus the Navy, ever present in large numbers in the harbor, is easily
identified with visible oil pollution.
4
-,
Fuel ~eguirements. The Navy uses about sixty-four million
barrels of all types of fuel annually.)~ 'Nhen it is cons Lder-ed that
each barrel is handled at least five times before it is consumed, the
magnf.tude of the !~otential for spills becomes even more apparent.,
For exac.pl.e , the sixty-four million barrels beccmes three hundred
twenty million or more in terrr~ of pollution risk potential. Add to
this the fact that most Navy oil spills occur in the harbor, where
physical effects are ~st severe, and it becomes obvious that the
Navy must be extremely careful to prevent oil spills.
Procurement and Handling. Handling this enormous amount
of fuel to keep the Navy's many ships, aircraft, and shore stations
operating entails many steps that add to the risk of pollution.
Following a shi.praent, of fuel through the supply system from purchase
to delivery aboard ship will best illustrate the extent of the
potential for pollution.
Once the fuel is purchased, Ravy interest in it starts ',o1ith the
loading at the refinery into vessels operatec or chartered by the
hilitary Sealift CorJrr.and. The oil is delivered to one of the Kavy
"fuel farms" located around the world where it is stored ready for
issue. It is at this point that Navy personnel first take physical
possession and control of the oil.
Distribution of the fuel to individual shir-s takes place at the
"fuel farm" piers or is piped to normal case piers. In SOIT.e ports
it is necessary to refuel large ships fro~ small yard oilers due to
draft liffiit~tions at normal refueling piers. Using yard oilers adds
only one additional step in the fuel handling process, but due to the
5
large capacities of ships requiring this method, it may take several
trips to complete the refueling process. Similarly, another step is
added in the distribution system by large oilers used for underway
replenishment. rlefueling from these oilers generally occurs outside
territorial waters and in most cases hundreds of miles at sea.
Potential spills in this handling do not constitute a visible proble~
at this time; however, they do add to the overall pollution of the
sea.
Even after the fuel is aboard the user ship there still exists
the potential for a spill. Internal handling is required to trim
ship, top off certain tanks, etc., which adds to the risk of a
spill due to personnel error. This personnel error during internal
handling is the most frequent cause of spills from Navy ships.
For various operational reasons large quantities o! fuel are
often returned to the fuel farm by user ships. 7his fuel is, of
course, reissued to another ship at a later time.
Policies and procedures designed to eliminate spills caused by
personnel error can be set forth at any level, but ir. practice it
will take consciencious supervisors and trained operators to eliminate
this, the ~avy's weakest link in the oil Follution prevention program.
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CHAf'!'ER III
Tf.E U2 ;'CT OF NE" rcucr
Executive Order :1507 has had far reaching effects on the Navy
at all levels of command. The most significant response thus far
is an instruction issued a.r the Chief of Naval Ope~ations, getting
the ~avy officially in the pollution prevention field. This in-
struction establishes the 'avy's environmental quality program and
sets forth Navy-wide policy for pollution prevention. Briefly it
states that the Navy will:
a) actively participate in a program to protect and
enhance the quality of the envirorur.ent;
b) conform to the provisions of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, as amended, insofar as the act
prohicits the discharge of oil ••• The intent of this
policy is to prohioit the discharge of all waste oil
and oily ~ixtures in all areas except when operational
emergency exists;
c) accelerate the pace of corrective ~easures to ~eet
environmental standards;
d) incorporate environmental pollution prevention
features in basic designs;
e) cooperate with other Federal, 3tat~ and local
agencies engaged in enviror.mental pollution abat.en.ent.,
and cou.ply with related standards ar.d criteria as
are oromul;ated by ~hose a~encies.l
Adhera~ce to this policy will require that personnel and resources,
currently committed to other projects, be reassigned to environrrlental
quality tasks. Just to maintain the present level of readiness, some-
one must, assume responsicility for the ori~inal assd gnn.ent,s , In the
face of reduced military forces and budgets, no new personnel are
7
seen to be available for these jobs. Existing ge~sonnel must assume
the increased workload. If they cannot, then the Navy's ability to
carry out its rr~ssion must suffer.
The ultimate goal of eLU!inating all discharees of waste oil
and oily rr~xtures will require larger slop tanks aboard ship. Space
will have to be allocated to these tanks, resulting in a reduction
of fuel capacity, fighting power, or personnel co~10rts. The latter,
seemingly insignificant, is a critical factor associated with two
other high priority defense programs, the retention of trained
personnel and the achievement of an all-volunteer force. Living
conditions aboard ship are of great concern to the "creature-comfort-
bred" young !~en of today and must be alloted sufficient priority in
allocation of space.
Increasing the pace of corrective measures and incorporating
environmental pollution protection devices in basic design require
increased allocation of funds. If the funds are not forthcoming
from the Office of ~_anagement and Sudget, the Navy must rechannel
funds from current projects. 3tate of the art in pollution centrol
is adequate to meet current and future predictable demands, but
without additional funding, progress has to be slow or at the
expense of other programs.
Notwitnstar.dir.3 the space requirements, it has been estimated
that outfitting Navy ships, where feasible, with sewage treatment
fQcilities alone, will cost about ~253 ITlillion.2 This figure does
not include oil pollution aoatewent features, consequently the
ultinate figure must be appreciably higher. The total ar.~unt may
8
;be equivalent to the price of an attack aircraft carrier or at least
three Folaris rr~s5ile submarines.) When viewed in this perspective,
the profound b:p2.ct of a tradeoff such as this becomes evident.
Complying 1,o,"ith state and local criteria' for oil pollution
prevention certainly will not have any effect on ships and stations
equipped to preclude all discharges of oil. However, if local re-
quirements are for specific types of equipment different from that
already installed, there may be considerable cor.flict. Also, home
port changes and visits to other areas ma~r find certain ships in
conflict with local laws. Attempting to keep track of ",'hat laws
apply where and consider them when planning routine port visits
will severely complicate planning ship movements. Aircraft operations
will present si~ilar problems. Dumping of fuel from ~avy aircraft is
often required during some ~issions. Local laws prohibiting release
of wastes into,the atmosphere could cause cessation of operations in
that locality if strict adherance to those laws is required. Also
o?eration of high altitUde, supersonic bombers may be in violation
of certain state's laws interned to restrict operation of supersonic
transports. Not1,o,~thstanding the legality or lack thereof of t~ese
laws, con.p.Liance \dth t:..em would prOhibit flight in th~ airspace
concerned. State and local lawmakers could create major obstructions
to Navy operations even if that were not their int8~tion.
Numerous other directives have also been issued requiring con-
siderable r-esccnse frm; individu;:.l comn.aads , One of these requires
submission of environmental iF.~~ct state~ents prior to taking any
action that ~~y have significant effects on the environment. 4
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hnother requires quarterly updating of a report listing all Navy
pollution abatement deficiencies, proposed corrective actions, and
estimated costs. 5 Thus each command is required to consider environ-
mental imp~cts prior to any action, to examine its o~n pollution
problems, and at least make suggestions tor correcting those problems.
Great importance is attached to identifying and evaluating
deficiencies and proposing corrective actions. For example, the Chief
of Naval Haterial has established a survey team to compile data on all
Naval forces afloat and ashore to evaluate the scope of the Navy-wide
oil pollution problem. All commands are required to report deficiencies
on a standard form and an inspection te~ has been established to sample
selected Ships, stations, and support activities to aid in the analysis
of the data collected.6 The fact that a Navy Commander, with a Naster
Of Science degree in Civil Engineering, is heading the team gives
an insight into the importance attached to the program by high levels
of command.
These and other instructions have created a flurry of activity
at all commands. Sorr.e of this activity has been productive and has
added significantly to pollution abatement; others have had no effect
on reducing pollution other than just removins it from sight.
In the administrative area, all stations have assigned an
officer with primary responsibility for oil pollution abateffient pro-
grams. Although there is no current requirement for this officer to
have had any forGal oil pollution training, two officers concerned
at one base have had such training and others are pl~~ing it in
the near future.? As new and intricate equipments and removal
10
techniques are devised, it will become ~perative that such train-
ing be given to those involved in oollution acaten.errt , The number
of supervisory personnel to be t~ained initially is not large and no
major problems are forseen.
In 1970, partially in response to instructions and p2rtly for
legal reasons, most stations began keeping so~e form of record of
8
oil spills. By simple analysis of the spill records, recurring
weak spots can be pin-pointed and corrective action taken to pre-
vent future spills from the same cause. l-~aterials required are
insignificant, but a reasonably responsible person must be assigned
to keep the records and evaluate the data. In all stations surveyed,
it appears that this area is adequately covered.
Station operating expenses will increase in the near future
(short term) to provide for the disposal of waste oil. In accordance
with instructions fro~ the Secretary of the Navy all d~ping of re-
fuse at sea ha~ been discontinued. 9 Until recently it was common
practice for Navy fuel h~lers to dump waste oil at sea if the
quality was too low for sale to local salva;:;e firms. Dumping was
always done within the law--more than fifty miles fro~ the coast--with
little or no notice taKen of the action. Early last December about
one-half million gallons of waste oil, dumped by the NaY'/, was driven
by winds and currents and threatened to cor.taminate local Florida
beaches .10 Public concern was aroused and the d'JJ..ping practice re-
vealed. It really was no secret, it just hadn't gotten public
interest until then. As a result of the stronJ public opposition
and the new Navy policy of environmental concern, this dumping
11
procedure has been discontinued. It is interesting to note that
disposal of the oil b,,- a waste oil dealer would have cost the Navy
only ~5COO while clean-up operations, had the oil reached shore,
would probably have been many times that Wtount, and possibly the
loss of favorab~e public opinion has already exceeded that ~ount.
The dQ~ping now prohibited applies to refuse collected in
port for disposal at sea. It does not pertain to nor~y accumulated
bilge water and refuse retained aboard while in port. Ships are
encouraged to make use of local facilities for trash and garbage
and, as an interim measure to reduce the potential for coastal
pollution, local ccca.ands are requiring ships to refrain from pump-
ing bilges within one hundred miles of the coast .11 Kavy-wide policy
prohibits pumping of any oily mixture within one hundred miles of the
nearest l~d in areas covered by the International Convention for
Prevention of ?ollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954.12 This Navy pro-
hibition is necessary inasmuch as warships are otherwise exempt from
the provisions of the co~vention. These provisions create little
difficulty for ships; meeting them requires only delaying pumping
for a few hours. This simple procedure substantially reduces the
possibil.ity of any of the oily J:,ixture reaching the beaches and at
the sarr,e time allows for easier biodegradation of the oil. This
~olicy is auequat,e to meef present regulations and public opi.ni.on
demsnda, but permittin5 dtL.ping at sea still adds to the overall
Follution of the ocean anC may be harn~ul to marine life. As the
ulti~~te goal of ~linanatiug all intentional discharges beco~e5 a
reality these restrictions will cease to have any effect on Navy
ships.
12
Procedures have been established and eq~pment provided to re-
duce immediately this intentional disposal of oily waste at sea.
Oil disposal r:"ngs and sludge barges are in u,je at various bases to
collect wastes in port. l) Oily wastes can then be disposed of ashore
or reprocessed. ~~orfolk Naval Base has a waste burning furnace in
which combustiole wastes of all kinds are burned to produce steam for
. 14
var10US uses. Follution is reducedJ the disposal problem and costs
eliminated, and useful energy obtained. SiJrilar systems at bases
around the world could improve operating efficiency and save the
Navy millions of dollars.
Utilization of civilian contractors for waste oil disposal
may create huge administrative problems as well as increas~ng costs
for the NaV'.{. This is due to a ~rovision that the Navy ascertain
that the contractor's ultimate disposal ~eets all applicable
poll~tion control requirements.15 Executing a contract ·~th a
disposal fir~ ~~ not be sufficient to ensure that compliance J and
ultimately the ~avy may have to inspect disposal facilities and
witness the processing to co~~ly with the instruction. A recent
incident in &~ode Island exemplifies the difficulties of govern-
ment supervision of the contractor. ifuen a s~ip in distress was
intentionally put aground in Narragansett Bay to prevent further
d~~age, a contractor was ~ired to pump out oily water from the ship
to prevent the rr,ixture f'r-or, polluting the bay. The contractor, in
violLtion of his co~tract ·~th the city in which he is licensed,
dUIT.ped this oily waste into a sanitary land fill, WDere it now
- 16
threatens to run into a nearby, already critically polluted creek.
I)
Notwitnstu.ndi:1g t~;e run-off into the creek, the possibility that
t~e oil will ultL~ately seep into the soil and cont~ate the
ground water is perhaps even mre important than the creek. The
point ~ere is that the contrGctor, hi~ed and supervised by people
with a direct interest in ~revention of oil pollution, violated
his contract, and disposed of the oil in an unacceptable manner.
Ensuring tha.t contractors meet local disposal regulations will be
a formidable task for ~avy officials.
In an effort to curb harbor pollution, refueling procedures
have also been made ~.ore stringent. Direct telephone communication
must be ~a.intained between the ship and the pier by a special watch
posted at the fueling valve. He is in a position to aecure the
valve if a dangerous situation occurs that may lead to an oil spill
(such as excessive fueling pressure) or if a spill actually occurs.
This procedure involves two men at least, and takes a ~inimum of
time to set up, but could be invaluable for ~imizing a spill if
trouble should develop.l?
Contingency plans and instructions are in effect or are being
developed for most oases. These directives assign responsibility
to various 5rouPS and iLdividuals for emergency clean-up operations.
As each ba.se is differeLt, the plans vary, but all are adequate.
iiuch improver-.ent in military and. civilian response capability could
be achieved if all bases (or Naval Districts) were required to
establish a plan based on toe Natd onaL Contmtency ::lan and coordinated
with the Co<.:.st:1u..rd and local governr..ent. This would provide large
14
:harbor ar-eas wi t.II a central Kavy organization for r.:.e.jor oil spill
action. T:lis is a.L.ost mandatory if tile :~avy is to achdeve a
self-contained clean-up capability. riaditionally it would help
streamline coordin~~ed operations where the Navy was called in to
assist in control of a civil spill.
15
CfL..PTEn IV
EstilI'.<:.i.ting .ieoutr-eeents , The Chief of Naval ¥.aterial is
currently cor:dt;.cting a study to ascertain the needs and estim:i.te the
costs of providing an integral clean-up capability to all bases. l
Results of this study are expected in June 1971.
Projected Costs. If one oil skimmer and two thousand feet
of contairur.ent boom are to be supplied to only the major base areas
referred to earlier, the cost of initial outfitting will run at least
one million dollars. Depending on the type of equipment and the level
of accessibility required, costs ~ay be ~any times the optimistic
figure set forth here. For exarr.?le, the Hampton aoads area has been
counted only once, while it actually contains nine bases. Travel
time by water ~etween bases is up to three hours. The S8rr.e trip by
land taKes about one-half that time. .3ufficiently prompt action to
contain and remove a spill in time to prevent major coastal da~age
may re~uire three or more complete sets of equiPffient.
Annu~l maintenance and replacement costs and man-hours involved
are impossible to estimate at the level of this paper, but they most
certainly will be substantial. Inestirr.able also are the costs of
submittin~, handling and receiving reports, and revision of directives
and procedures as experience grows.
Cost Sffectiveness. The cost of supplying pollution abate-
ment equipment to each base in sufficient quantity to combat any
possible spill is disproportionate to the require~ents of day to day
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operations. :r'or example, at the bases surveyed, the largest recorded
spill thut occurred during the period 1 July 1970 to 1 Karch 1971 was
esti1:.ated at one thousand gallons and was the result of material
failure during a storm. This spill far exceeded all others which
averaged twenty-five to fifty gallons, occurred about twice a week,
and generally were emitted by snips transferring fuel internally.2
Clean-up of this "normal" spill requires only sufficient absorbents
to collect the oil, and manpower, usually supplied by the ship
generating the spill, to scoop up the saturated absorbents. ~isposal
of the absorbent is accomplished ashore. ~ajor equipments are not
required nor would they be particularly effective in close quarters
around the piers. Excer::t for the occasional large spill, major
equipments will oe of i..:.se only for clean-up of an occasional spill
from ships anchored in open or partly protected roadsteads. Con-
tainment of the oil could be effected, then la:ge equipment used to
remove it. Other than this, large eq,uipment ·Nill probably sit idle
for long perioas, hopefully years at a time. However, periodic
maintenance and operator training will be re;uired. From personal
experience, equipments left idle frequently fall into a state of
poor repair until a crisis requiring their use occurs. They are
then of little use for their intended pur?ose. It could be argued
that fire fighting equi~~ents are maintained in generally excellent
cor-dition although idle most of the tiffie. However, this operation
requires Lar-ge numbers of men permanently assigned to the task.
Providing con.par-ao.Le number's of t.r-ai.r.ed personnel to operate and
~aintain the pollution apparatus for exclusive Navy use is prohibitive
from a cost effectiveness standpoint.
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Alternatives. An acceptable alternative would be to ~ro-.
vide limited equipment capable of assisting ships in removing the
small spill or containing the large spill, &n~ then ccntractir.g with
civilian firms for clean-up on a "nen-required oasis. 111e drawback
is the current shortage of equiPffient on the civilian market and
possible excessive time delays in transporting equ~pment to the
scene. A qUick reaction capability for minor spill removal siFilar
to the above suggestion is a goal established by the Chief of Naval
Operations,3 but at the present time it appears inadequate due to
the lack of civilian equipment as back up for major clean-up opera-
tions. (In the New England area, for exaapl.e; there is only one
4-
eivilian skimmer available for oil removal.)
A second, more desirable solution from the standpoint of an
integral Navy clean-up capability and favorable public relations,
is for the :\avy. to maintain equipments thi:!.t would also be available
to the civilian cow~unity to handle spills from co~mercial ships or
shore facilities. Legislation would have to be enacted to provide
for such a syst.em and to strean:line coordination with other federal
agencies Lnvo.ived , Requests for assistance of I\avy equipment must
now be handled at the departmental level, a time-consuming process.
5
The equipment would be available for immediate use for occasional
Kavy s~ills requiring it and would be justified on a cost-effectiveness
basis due to IT.ultiple users. Reimbursement to the Navy could come from
a contingency fund or directly fro@ the using a~ency. Sorr.e economic
efficiency will probably result as civilian corporations and state
and local agencies will probably not buy their own equipment if
federally operu.ted and maintained equipment is readily available.
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Helicopter ~ssistance. Depending on the size and type of
equipments, time late at the scene of a spill could be reduced through
the use of Navy helicopters which are available at all but one of the
east coast Naval bases. The Coast Guard currently is operating a
similar sJ~tem called ADAPTS (Air Deliverable Anti-Pollution Transfer
6System). It consists of air transportable, submersible transfer
pumps, a 40 hp diesel engine, hoses, and a collapsable rubber storage
tank. The equipment is flown to the scene and parachuted to the ship
in distress. Oil re~ainins aboard the vessel can be loaded into the
rubber storage tank to preclude leakage from the ship. Although the
rubber storage tank is too heavy to be carried by the helicopter, the
engine, pumps, and hoses can be handled easily. There is no apparent
reason why similar equipment to remove oil fro~ the surface couldn't
be designed for helicopter delivery. Use of the helicopter could
reduce time from one-fourth to one-tenth of that required to deliver
equipment by surface means. This could be a significant factor even
if the helicopter is used only for transporting containment devices.
Such a system might include a compressed gas inflated containment
boom tnat could be lowered to the ship and deployed by one of the
ship's own small boats. };ajor abateffient capability maintained by
the Navy would be enhanced considerably by incorporation of helicopter
delivery, a method not generally available to non-military interests.
Effectivene3s of Existing Capabilities. As public concern
over oil pollution has been ~ounting, base co~~.anders have not been
waitin~ idly for the results of the surveys and studies and the
pro~ulgation of policy from Washington. Considerable action has
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been taken at the local level to provide adequate clear.-up capabfLf.t.Les,
Under the direction of the Enviror~ntalControl officer, the pollution
abatement procedures and equipments on hand are adequate for the normal
spill. Additional equipment and supplies are being procured by rr.ost
stations to further iIr.prove capabilities. Absorbents are stocked
locally in sufficient quantity for routine requir~ents and mechanical
containment devices are available in various amounts from a few hundred
to two thousand feet. 7 Even the latter amount is inadequate for some
applications. For eX&~ple, it is insufficient to encircle a large
attack aircraft carrier if required to contain a spill. Several
bases have mechanical skiJr.mers, either converted Navy reserve small
craft or one-of-a-kind experimental devices. One thing all these
skimmers have in conanon is that they are all "jury rigged", interim
devices. They are adequate for small spills in calm water but are
hopelessly inadequate for large spills in open areas of the harbor,
.
partic~larly in adverse weather cor.ditions. Instructions for one
skimmer state that operation is hazardous at all times and extremely
8dangerous at r.:'ght.
Consider a ship the size of a destroyer running around near the
Dumplings ih Narragansett Bay in seas of three to five feet. A spill
amountir.g to only ten percent of its capacity would put twenty-one
tnousand gallons of black oil on the water. Recovery of the oil
spilled before a cont~ination of nearby beaches and shoreline occurs
is hard to imasine. In fact, the combir.ed resources of Newport Naval
Base and all of the (~ew England region would be insufficient to contain
20
and remove the oil before it reached shore. The cest that could oe
expected would ae a reduction of the extent and severity of the
contamination ~d rapid clean-up of the beaches. Although base
co~~anders are aware of the problem and are atteL~ting to obtain
ajequate equipment, without considerable additional fundir.g, capa-
bilities will continue to remain l~ted.
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CHa?TBR V
Jeneral Gperations. The }~litar.Y Sealift Co~nand, (K3C)
under the Department of the ~aVYJ is responsible for all Department
of Defense waterborne co~erce and as such has been affected con-
siderably by anti-pollution legislation and pub.Li,c attitudes. ~:SC
operates about fifty-five tankers, twenty-four of which are govern-
1
ment owned and the remainder chactered from civilian companies.
During the six months from July thru Dec~ber 1970, these ships
carried a total of about eighty million barrels of various fuel
. 2o~l products. This is the equivalent of about one-hundred trips
of the Torrey Canyon, or in pollution potential about two hundred
Torrey Canyon Pollution Potential Ur~ts annually. ~ith a pollution
potential thi~ great and the prooability that an incident ~ould
bring unfavorable publicity to the Navy, the Departffient of the Navy
and the hilitary 3ealift Cona.and have been deeply concerned about
pollution prevention.
hilitary Sealift Com.and, in keeping with the intent of
~ecutive Order 11507, is progressing rapidly with pollution pre-
vention programs. Many new policies and procedures have been
adopted wi thin the last year. .~o:ne of these pclicies and procedures
will have far rea.ching effects on both the :·~:;C ships and the Navy
combatant, types. Inaemuch as ;.3C carries all Department of Defense
fuels, all rrilitary activities will feel some effects.
Federal ~teguirements. Although not all sections of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act apply to public vessels, the
Commander- LSC has directed that all ~.3C ships and vessels under
bareboat charter shall observe all provisions of the Act.) This
regulation requ~res operators of E3C vessels to report any discharges
of oil that are in violation of the Act. Tnis procedure will at
least allow some clean-up action to be taken on a spill that other-
wise might go unreported.
Local Regulations. Although local governments have no
jurisdiction over federally operated vessels, and their laws vary
widely from port to port, f~C vessels have been directed to comply
with local regulations.4 To implement this policy ~~C periodically
issues notices containing pertinent local regulations. ~epresenta-
tive of these is a December 1970 notice alerting ships of the air
pollution requirements of several west coast ports. 5 Compliance
by ships will probably not significantly affect their operation
but keeping track of local regulations and disserr~nating the informa-
tion will be a major administrative task for XSC.
Departmental Regulations. Consideration of pollution
potential is required in planning L3C activities. ay separate
instruction, ~3C activities must submit environmental impact state-
6
ments in the same manner as operatir.g and support forces.
Load-On-Top Procedures. l".3C now requi.r-es comcLiance with
all . t ., 7load-on-top procedures, called the clean seas code, by 1 s S~1pS.
In many ca3es this will r2sult in a reduction of c~r60 carrying
capacity on some le5s of a voyage. 3pecific instructions have been
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issued for shi~s for tank cleaning procedures and consolidation of
wastes in a slop tank. If no facilities are available to offload
waste in a particular port, it is to be retair.ed on board ~til
s~ch t~,e as it can be discharged to suitable shore receiving
faci~ties. Carried to extremes, it is easy to visualize a tanker
carryins more waste than clean cargo. iJith t-anker- capacities
partially reduced by this procedure, more trips will be required
to transport a given Gmount of fuel, thereby increasiug operating
costs.
Deballasting. }~C provides information on deballast
facilities to ship masters by publishing a table of the facilities
of over one hundred twenty-five commercial and military fueling
depots around the ·~rld.8 Originally pUblished in April 1970,
rapid construction has already required updating of the list.
Frequent additions are anticipated in the near future as public
concern induces and new laws require co~ercial firms to install
such equi.pmerrt , i.aintainir.,-s the listing up-to-date will entail
considerable effort and expense.
As these facilities beco~~ more r.~Terous and information more
widely circulated, it is anticipated that Defense Supply Agency
will limit purchases to those producers who maintain adequate
9deballast facilities ~t their loading ter~~nals•. hdherance to
tiis ?Olicy '~ll increase costs to military purchasers due ~o
longer transit times and lon~er in port turn around tir,es ir.curred
in offloadin5 slops ond ballast. As the nurr~er of available facilities
increases and offloading procedures improve, it is expected that the
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effects of this policy will oe gradually reduced. Costs of operating
deballast facilities will eventually be reflected in higher prices to
all consun.er-s ,
Research and ~evelo:~e~t. Research is also being cor.ducted
into the feasibility of incor?Orating oil-water separators in exist-
ing snips.10 New vessels will probably include such equip~ent and
possibly separate ballast systems. The difficulty in this program
is designing a system to handle large quantities of oil-water
mixture which may contain many different types of oil in infinite
ratios with the water and developing reliable monitoring equipment.
The problems faced by ~:3C in meeting pollution control require-
ments are not insurmountable but to achieve success we must accept
the nign costs involved. The external costs of pollution are
being transformed into internal costs and ~ltimately must be in-
eluded in operating budgets.
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IcknE~i VI
OUTLOOK FOR TH~ FU'IUnE
Spills in Foreign fort5. If Navy operations continue at
present levels, oil pollution problems in the internation~ arena
will be of increasing concern to the Navy. To preclude major inter-
national incidents, integral clean-up capabilities will have to be
provided to all ~hips for control of spills in foreign ports. There
is no aS3urance that foreign ports will be equipped to assist visit-
ing ships with oil spill control.
Resort areas, freq~ently visited by Navy s~ips for rest ~~d
recreation, are extremely sensitive to even small spills. On
13 July 1965 the U.3.3. Shan6ri-La, (CVh-38), during a routir.e port
visit spilled an estimated 2400 gallons of black fuel oil off the
coast of Cannes, France. l Amazingly, in spite of the fact that
except for carbonized sand no other abatement supplies ~ere avail-
able and much of the oil reached the beaches, removal efforts were
successful and no permanent damage occurred to the beaches or the
*tourist trade. However, it isn't likely that the Navy will be
this fortun~te in the future. Reasonable planning must include
having adequate pollution control equipment available. Provision
of oil containrr.ent booffi to isolate the spill in the vicinity of
the snip would have made clean-up operations infinite~ easier and
presented the picture of an effective Navy capability.
*Clean-up took only one day and consisted of applying sinking
agents cf'fsnor-e, runneLl.tn« the oil reac~in'!, shore into trenche~
du~ alons t~e beach where it was physically removed, and replac~ng
blackened sand.
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This spill, during the height of the tou~st season and on
the eve of 3astille Day, could h~ve permanently damaged both the
United States reL.tions with France and the Navy's public image.
h similGr incident today, when U.3. forces are atte~pting to main-
tain a "low profile" abroad and when mc.:ny groups would like to keep
the u•o , l~avy out of their part of the world, migh~ be even more
disastrous and have adverse effects on national security.
Assistance from Central Deoots. Containment booms and
absorbents stocked at m~jor bases, such as nota, Naples, and Holy
Loch, ~~l prove only marginally effective in asaisting removal of
a spill in other than their local areas, due to the time element
involved. For example, if helicopter delivery of this equipment
were available, as suggested earlier for domestic employment, it
is estllu&ted that time fro~ initial request to delivery of supplies
to Cannes fro,E Naples Could be at least six hours. Such a delay is
clearly unacceptable. If, however, the oil was already contained
by equipment on hand, short delays while awaiting delivery of
sk~~~rs or otier re~oval equipment by air would be entirely satis-
factory.
Ship Carried Equipment. It is evident from the above
discussion that all ships visiting forei~n ports must be provided
with at least conta~r~ent equipment. Large ships s~ould probably
also have sufficient e~uipment to contain and remove a spill from
any ship in its sroup. Smaller shi.ps could load equi.pment, en a
temporary b~sis when conducting independent visits to non-~avy
equipped ports.
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Rep~esentdtive equipment for a large ship ~i~~t include as a
~~nimum two thousand feet of inflatable oil containment boom, a
vacuum type skirr~er and purr~s suitable for use from a 40 foot utility
boat, some sort of collapsable storage tank, and sufficient absorbents
to remove final traces of oil. Smaller ships on independent duty
~ght carry only the boom and absorbents. Initial purchase costs
will be astronomical but precluding the alternative, a major inter-
national incident, appears worth t~e price.
Prevention Methods. Although spills resulting from personnel
error, similar to the one described above are not likely to be co~
pletely eliminated, there is much that can be done to avoid or reduce
damage. For example, in ports where it is aVailable, containrrent
boom should be rigged in such a manner as to isolate a ship prior to
commencing routine fueling operations. Any resultant spill would
then be totally contained and easily re~oved with little or no danger
of contarrination of adjoining coastline. Costs of operation in this
manner should be minimal and easily absorbed in operating budgets.
This procedure is now in use in Portland, Kaine and has proven
successful. 2
An even siI.pler procedure to avoid adverse publicity and damage
in resort areas would oe to ~rohibit internal transfer of fuel except
to service tanks, while in resort ports. If trim couldn't be adjusted
by transferring water, then a slight out-of-trim condition could be
accepted as the price to help avoid pollution incidents.
Installation of automatic shut-off devices in overflow lines or
overflow lines leading into slop tanks might be another easy way to
avoid accidental spills. With such devices inst~ed, pumping oil
overboard during internal transfer will become difficult if not
impossible.
Fuel Conversion. The Navy will probably convert all
non-nuclear ships to a distillate fuel someti~e in the near future.
This change will e~ate the gross contamir.ation and blackening
of oeaches resulting from a black oil spill but it brings its own
unique prcal.ems , Distillate ruel, a higher volatile fraction of
crude oil, is more dar.Aging to marine life than the heavier
fractions.) Thus, while distillate is less of a problem from
the physical aspect, it is potentially more hazardous to marine
life. The fact that distillate fuel is relative~y undetectable
may allow the accidental discharge to continue for a considerable
t~~ before it is discovered and secured and may also allow small
spills to go cOmpletely undetected, unreported and uncorrected.
Research and Development. The possibility exists that
all sewage, garoage, (except metallic items), and other conbustible
wastes, including oily water mixtures rr~ay be converted to water and
harmless gasses aboard ship, there by eliminating all intentional
disposal of wastes at sea. Research is being conducted into a pro-
cess that will make this possible (the Zimmerman Frocess).4 This
system essentially oxidizes all sewage and combustible wastes by.
a high te~perature, fl~eless process which yields water and harm-
less gasses. Such a device aboard sni.p could provide auxilliary
heat and fresh water as by-products to its primary function. It
is possiole that a similar combustion process may be developed for
main propulsion power. Then wastes would sin'ply become additional
fuel, resulting in the reduction of overall cor.ver.tional fuel require-
ments.
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Research is also being conducted ~~der Office of ~aval Research
contract into biological degradation of oil as ~ oil slick removal
method. 1wo parallel studies are being co~ducted, one into the use
of natural marine bacteria and the other into the use of yeast. 5
Elimination of slicks in this manner is certainly more desirable
than by use of dispersants or sirlking agents, but it also has draw-
backs. Concentrations of bacteria after the oil is consumed m~ have
adverse effects on biological food chains much as the concentrations
of nutrients in some waters has resulted in severe algae pollution.
The possibility is very real for a similar situation to evolve from
oil eating bacteria.
Abatement Operations. 'Hhen the studies discussed earlier
are evaluated and decisions made as to equipment procureLent, it is
anticipated t~at the Navy will ultimately possess sufficient capability
to become the major pollution abatement company. Although current
policy does not intend that the Navy supply abatement equipment for
all sectors of industry and government, emergency operations will
undoubtedly result in the use of Navy equipment. Ultirr.ately the
Navy will co~e to be relied on to provide the equipment. From that
point on, like it or not, the Navy will be the major operator of
abatement equipment. The best action is to plan now for Navy
participation at this level so that funds can be allocated and plans
forrr,ulated to put the syste~ in operation at the earliest possible
time.
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